DCI/IC 74-2304

27 August 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Follow-On to NSCIC Meeting of 23 August 1974

1. The following summary of actions called for as a result of the NSCIC meeting of 23 August, is based on a debrief from LGEN Graham, who attended with Mr. Colby, and telephone conversation with Richard Ober, NSC Staff (who expects formal minutes will be issued).

### Agenda Item 1 - Perspectives for Intelligence 1975-1980

The NSCIC Working Group is to review and submit its recommendations re "policy issues" in the paper within three to six weeks.

Gen. Graham said comments were to be solicited from representatives only of the principals (rather than the full membership of the Working Group as it functioned in 1972-1973).

Dr. Kissinger described the paper as "thoughtful."

## Agenda Item 2 - Key Intelligence Questions for FY 1975

The KIQs, with an addition proposed by Dr. Kissinger, are to be reviewed by the NSCIC Working Group and recommendations forwarded to the NSCIC. (Gen. Graham said this was not to be a "formal approval" by the NSCIC but more comment on the concept.)

Dr. Kissinger's proposal: How do the Soviets justify to themselves their strategic armaments program -- are they seeking superiority or playing "catch up?"

(PRD picked up action on this with the NIO.)

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Dr. Kissinger noted that after every crisis, key users can read the intelligence which was available, but too often important intelligence does not seem to reach him or the President. Mr. Colby agreed the Watch Report was unsatisfactory and perhaps something like an Intelligence Alert Memorandum is needed. (Proposed IAM instruction is in staffing now.)

Action item: PRD is to prepare a report for the NSCIC Working Group on what is being done to improve handling of intelligence in pre-crisis situations. The Working Group will forward this report to the NSCIC with its comments.

In addition to tactical warning, Dr. Kissinger wants intelligence which is presented to him to clearly indicate the trends when matters are moving toward a warning situation. (His concept is akin to Dr. Belden's -- "warning is not warning unless you expect someone to do something about it.") The report to the Working Group should include proposals as to how this situation should be approached. Dr. Kissinger indicated he did not like the new "National Intelligence Daily." Mr. Colby noted that a poll of recipients had been quite favorable.

#### Agenda Item 3 - Intelligence Resources Overview

(None of the handouts were used.)

Mr. Colby's report that intelligence organizations had taken about a 40 percent cut in personnel over the past several years apparently came as a surprise to Dr. Kissinger and others and led to a discussion of the need for first class analysts.

Secretary Clements commented at some length that intelligence collection was good, but analysis was inadequate and conclusions are "miserable."

Dr. Kissinger considers the "people problem" an important issue for the NSCIC. Mr. Clements proposed the Working Group make recommendations on major issues. (The IRAC is to be requested to prepare a study of the situation for submission to the NSCIC Working Group.)

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#### Agenda Item 4 - HR 15845 to Amend the CIA Charter

No action taken.

# Agenda Item 5 - Proposed Legislation on Protection of Intelligence Sources and Methods

This is to be examined by a special NSCIC Working Group panel of legislative counsel representatives, probably headed by John Warner, General Counsel of the CIA. The panel is to analyze the bill to determine if NSCIC support is needed.

State considered the bill was too limited and wondered if classified U.S. information other than intelligence should be covered. Defense questioned whether classified U.S. weapons data should not also be included.

#### Agenda Item 6 - Proposed "Omnibus" NSCID

The concept of an Omnibus NSCID was accepted by the NSCIC after Mr. Colby explained the single NSCID was intended to codify the situation as it exists and as the President ordered it in his November 1971 memorandum.

Mr. Clements considered that CIA was trying to use this document to shift responsibilities between agencies.

(General Graham was uncertain as to whether the NSCID is to be limited to what is now in NSCIDs or to go beyond this, as the draft now does, to include new material such as that on the Air Force Special Program.)

The NSCIC Working Group is to obtain coordination on the draft Omnibus NSCID and forward the coordinated paper to the NSCIC.

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Agenda Item 8 - National/Tactical Intelligence Interface

Not considered by the NSCIC.

New Agenda Item - "The fact of" Satellite Reconnaissance

The NSCIC Working Group is to prepare recommendations for consideration by the NSCIC. The real issue is the matter of cover for the Air Force Special Program as a part of the DOD. The Working Group will have as basis for its discussions, Mr. Colby's "pro" position and the "con" position of the Secretary of Defense, and the USIB minutes at which this problem was discussed.

NOTE: Mr. Ober said Gen. Scowcroft intended to discuss with Mr. Colby the chairmanship of the Working Group, the Group membership, and how it should operate.

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